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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
ROBERT WILLIAM SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900266-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14; 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-50 (1986); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1982); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1982); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4 (1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the officers possess probable cause to believe that 
Appellant was involved in a burglary? 
2. Did the officers violate Appellant's constitutional 
rights when they entered his apartment? 
A. Did the State prove that the officers received 
Appellant's consent to enter his apartment? 
B. Did Appellant give valid consent? 
C. If Appellant consented, did the officers exceed 
the scope of consent? 
3. Were the officers justified in searching Appellant's 
wife? 
4. Did the State prove that Appellant's wife voluntarily 
consented to the search of the apartment? 
5. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
Appellant's motion to suppress? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The standard of review for a trial court's finding of fact 
is that a finding shall not be set aside unless it is clearly 
erroneous. A finding not supported by substantial, competent 
evidence must be rejected." State v. Arroyo. 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 
14 (Utah 1990). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On November 1, 1989, the State and Defendant/Appellant 
Robert W. Smith appeared before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno during 
a motion to suppress proceeding. Record at 97; Transcript of Motion 
to Suppress Proceedings, dated November 1, 1989 [hereinafter 
referred to as "MS"] at 1-45. Thereafter, the court denied 
Appellant's motion. (R 63). Appellant Smith then entered a guilty 
plea conditioned upon his right to withdraw the plea if, following 
his appeal, this Court held that the trial court erred in denying 
the motion to suppress. (R 64-70). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 18, 1989, Officer Michael Ted Jensen responded 
to a dispatch report of a burglary at "Broadway Pharmacy" on 
242 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. (MS 2, 3, 12). Officer 
Jensen contacted the owner of the pharmacy and discovered that 
"large amounts" of pharmaceutical drugs were missing. 
(MS 3, 12, 13). A "bunch of quarters" were also missing. 
(MS 4, 13). Approximately forty-five minutes after Officer Jensen 
arrived at the scene, he was approached by an individual, Mr. Cook, 
who "stated that he had found a partially full container of Demerol 
in the apartment complex where he lived." (MS 4, 12). 
Cook directed Officer Jensen and an accompanying officer, 
Officer Linton, to the the apartment complex. (MS 4, 12). Once 
inside the complex, Cook indicated that he had found the container 
in the hallway of the "second floor." (MS 5, 14). After inspecting 
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the spot where Cook had found the container, the officers looked "up 
and down the hallway to see if [they] could find any more items that 
may have [been] related to the burglary." (MS 5, 14). 
Approximately fifteen minutes later, the officers found 
"two quarters" on the third floor of the apartment. (MS 6, 14). 
One quarter was "directly next to the door [of Robert Smith's] 
apartment [number 13]." (MS 6, 14). Without taking any action,1 
the officers returned to their police car and radioed Sergeant 
Jackson for assistance. (MS 27). When Jackson arrived, Officers 
Jensen and Linton were waiting for him outside the apartment. 
(MS 27). After Jensen and Linton told Jackson about the "evidence" 
that they had found, the officers returned to apartment number 13. 
(MS 28). 
Standing outside the door, the officers heard the Smith's 
arguing about their child. "Apparently, she had a child that had 
been taken by the police and put into protective custody." 
(MS 24). She was upset with her husband, telling him, "you 
shouldn't have walked away from the kid. . . She kept talking about 
drugs and, you know, you need to get help, and just things like 
that." (MS 24). The officers listened to the argument for five to 
ten minutes before deciding to act. (MS 15, 24). 
1
 Officer Jensen's testimony indicates that after he and 
Officer Jensen found the quarters by the Smith apartment, they 
listened to the arguing and then knocked on the door. (MS 7). 
Jensen also indicated that Sergeant Jackson had joined them and 
listened to the argument, too. (MS 15). Howcrver, Sergeant 
Jackson's testimony reveals that the investigating officers must 
have first returned to their police car and awaited Jackson's 
arrival before they knocked on the door. (MS 27). 
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According to the Smiths, in the midst of their argument, 
"The door flew open and the police officers [were] in our home 
[apartment thirteen]." (MS 33, 38). They damaged the door handle 
and the door frame. (MS 36). The door would no longer lock from 
the inside or the outside. (MS 40). The officers walked into the 
apartment and claimed that they had a search warrant. (MS 33). 
They searched the apartment and arrested the Smiths without any sort 
of explanation. (MS 35). Robert Smith and his wife were handcuffed 
on a love seat and a couch in the living room. (MS 35, 41). The 
officers did not knock on the door before entering the apartment, 
nor did they receive permission to enter or search the apartment. 
(MS 33, 34). They seized some Demerol, a syringe, and approximately 
$4.00 worth of quarters from Robert Smith's pockets. (MS 10, 11). 
No other kinds of drugs were found. (MS 20). 
The story told by the police differed greatly from the 
testimony of the Smiths. According to the police, after they 
reached the Smith's apartment they listened to the Smiths "yelling" 
for five to ten minutes before knocking on their door. (MS 7). The 
officers sought "to find out what the disturbance was about and see 
if we could get them quieted down. And the other reason was to ask 
about the burglary." (MS 8). Yet, when Robert Smith answered the 
door, Jensen asked only, "what the noise was about [and] informed 
him they were creating a disturbance." (MS 8). Jensen did not 
express his desire to discuss the burglary of the Broadway 
Pharmacy. (MS 28). According to the police, Robert Smith agreed to 
let the officers in to talk about the argument. (MS 16). 
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Officer Jensen noticed two more quarters on the floor in 
the front room. (MS 17). Jensen approached Robert Smith while 
Sergeant Jackson confronted Linda Smith "just inside the doorway to 
the kitchen, probably ten feet away" from her husband. (MS 9, 24). 
Jackson observed Linda Smith "holding a box in one hand and 
walking towards the garbage can with it. . . ." (MS 25). She had 
her other "hand clenched." Jackson saw her put the box in the 
garbage and noticed that her other hand was still closed. "So [he] 
asked her, 'What do you have in there? What's in there?' And she 
reached over and put her hand over on the counter. So [he] just 
grabbed her [by the wrist] and she opened [her hand] up and there 
were two glass ampules in her hand." (MS 25). Jackson looked at 
the box in the garbage which had the word, Demerol, written on it. 
(MS 25). 
He asked her, "Do you mind if we look through your 
apartment and search?" According to Jackson, she said, "Okay." 
(MS 26). Jackson told the other officers that she had consented to 
the search. (MS 31). At this point, the officers handcuffed 
Mr. Smith and placed him under arrest. (MS 11). Mrs. Smith was 
also handcuffed. (MS 18). The officers arrested only Mr. Smith, 
because "witnesses had described a white male adult fleeing the 
scene of the burglary and only a white male adult." (MS 11). The 
officers "called another officer to stand by M!r. Smith, just to 
watch him." (MS 31). Jackson then supervised Officers Linton and 
Jensen in the search of the apartment but Jackson did not actually 
participate in the search. (MS 26, 31). The officers took 
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photographs of the apartment, the door, and the hallway before 
completing their investigation. (MS 44). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The police officers' conduct in entering Appellant's 
apartment, without a warrant, was unlawful. No exigent 
circumstances existed, nor were they in "hot pursuit" of a suspect. 
The respective parties disagree on whether Appellant consented to 
the officers' entry into the apartment and whether Appellant's wife 
consented to the search of the apartment. The State did not meet 
its burden of proof on either type of consent. 
If the officers forced their way into Appellant's 
apartment, as alluded to by the facts, the officers' conduct cannot 
be justified under any circumstance. A warrantless, nonconsensual 
entry into an individual's home is unconstitutional. 
If the officers received Appellant's consent, it was 
obtained involuntarily in response to a pretextual excuse used by 
the police and pursuant to their "color of authority." The officers 
exceeded the scope of consent when they conducted a search of 
Appellant's wife for reasons unconnected to the purpose given for 
their entry into the apartment. The search of her "person" could 
not be justified since there were no facts supportive of probable 
cause nor was there a fear that Appellant's wife could be armed or 
dangerous. 
In addition to the prior police illegalities, all of which 
invalidated the officers' subsequent conduct, the consent given by 
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Appellant's wife could not be considered to have been given freely 
and intelligently. She consented to the search only after an 




POLICE WERE PROHIBITED FROM MAKING A WARRANTLESS AND 
NONCONSENSUAL ENTRY INTO APPELLANTS HOME. 
"It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law7 that 
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980). The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . 
U.S. Const, amend IV; accord Utah Const, art. I, § 14. As explained 
below, the police officer's warrantless and nonconsensual entry 
inside the Smiths' apartment violated Robert and Linda Smith's 
constitutional rights. The trial court erred in denying the motion 
to suppress. (R 63). 
A. PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST FOR THE OFFICERS' 
ENTRY INTO THE APARTMENT. 
"A peace officer may . . . without [a] warrant, arrest a 
person . . . when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has 
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it. . . ." U.C.A. §77-7-2 (1982). 
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"'[P]robable cause to justify an arrest means facts and 
circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to 
warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing 
under the circumstances shown that the suspect has committed, or is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); cf. State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 
1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) ("The standard for evaluating an arrest 
for an offense not committed in the officer's presence is an 
objective one: '[W]hether from the facts known to the officer, and 
the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable 
arid prudent person in his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense'"). 
Following the burglary of "Broadway Pharmacy," the facts 
available to the investigating officers were very general and of 
little assistance. A "male white adult" wearing "blue jeans" was 
seen "fleeing the scene" of the crime. (MS 19). Such a vague 
description represents the vast majority of the Salt Lake City male 
population. No specific characteristics were reported, including 
such general features as height, weight, or hair color. The 
physical description of the suspect could not have provided any 
basis for probable cause. Cf. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 331 A.2d 189 
(Penn. 1975) (probable cause did not exist for the arrest of 
suspects matching a general description, broadcasted over the police 
radio, of "two Negro males in dark clothing, 5'6" to 5'8" in height, 
with medium builds, medium to dark complexions and semi-bush 
haircuts"). 
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According to the owner of the pharmacy, the suspect took "a 
large amount of narcotics" and "a bunch of quarters" from the 
store. (MS 3, 4, 13). The owner would not be sure of how much of 
each type of narcotic was missing "until he did a complete 
inventory." (MS 13). However, Officer Jensen apparently assumed 
that Demerol had been taken2 from the burglary when a "Mr. Cook" 
told him "that he [Cook] had found a partially full container of 
Demerol in the apartment complex where he lived." (MS 4, 12). 
Officer Jensen's testimony did not establish, nor did the State in 
any other manner prove, that the pill container was in fact a 
"fruit" of the pharmacy burglary. Officer Jensen did not ask the 
owner of the pharmacy if the pill container may have been stolen 
from his store. (MS 4-5, 12-13). Instead, Jensen and an 
accompanying officer, Officer Linton, having already been at the 
scene of the burglary for approximately forty-five minutes without 
any apparent "leads," assumed that Mr. Cook's "discovery" was 
related to the burglary.3 
2
 The owner did not state that "Demerol" was missing at 
the time he first spoke to Officer Jensen. Rather, the owner told 
Officer Jensen that he would not be sure of how much of each type of 
narcotic was missing "until he did a complete inventory." (MS 13). 
Thereafter, upon completing their "investigation" of the Smiths' 
apartment, the officers did determine that Demerol had been taken. 
The owner "did do a partial inventory" of his pharmacy by the time 
Robert Smith had been arrested. (MS 21). 
3
 The record does not reveal the circumstances surrounding 
Mr. Cook's finding of the pill container. The officers indicate 
only that Cook directed them to the place where he found the pill 
container—on the "[s]econd floor in the hallway next to the 
stairs." (MS 5). The officers did not state, nor does it appear 
(continued) 
- 10 -
Mr. Cook showed the officers where he had found the 
container in the hallway of the "second floor" of the apartment 
complex. (MS 5, 14). Officers Jensen and Linton then "looked 
around the apartment building, up and down the hallway to see if 
[they] could find any more items that may have [been] related to the 
burglary." (MS 5, 14). Approximately fifteen minutes later, the 
officers found "two quarters" on the third floor of the complex. 
(MS 6, 14). One quarter was "directly next to the door" of 
apartment number 13. (MS 6, 14). Finding two quarters on the third 
floor of an apartment complex does not support a finding of probable 
cause. The coins were found on a level entirely different from the 
level on which the pill container was found. The coins were not 
unique or identifiable, nor was the amount of "change" significant, 
especially in an apartment complex where laundry facilities would be 
available. 
Upon seeing the quarters, one of two things occurred. 
Officers Jensen and Linton either returned immediately to their 
police car to radio Sergeant Jackson,4 or they first listened to the 
(footnote 3 continued) 
that they knew, whether Mr. Cook was returning to, or coming from, 
the apartment complex when he "found" the container; if Cook was 
returning to the apartment, how long had he been away from the 
apartment?; if he was leaving his apartment, how long had he been in 
his room?; how often did he "[pass] by" the place where the pills 
were found?; in which apartment did he live?; on which floor did he 
live?; how large was the apartment complex?; and how long was the 
pill container there before it was found? 
4
 See supra note 1. In addition, when the officers 
radioed Sergeant Jackson for assistance, they did not discuss a 
"disturbing the peace situation." (MS 27). 
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Smiths "yelling" and "creating a disturbance" before calling for 
assistance, (MS 27) . Under either scenario, the two officers took 
no action until Sergeant Jackson arrived. (MS 27) . 
When Jackson arrived, Officers Jensen and Linton told him 
about the "property" that they had found. (MS 27). The three 
officers returned to apartment number 13. (MS 28). They stood 
outside the apartment door, listening to the Smiths arguing about 
their child. "Apparently, she had a child that had been taken by 
the police and put into protective custody." (MS 24). Sh€> was 
upset with her husband, telling him, "you shouldn't have walked away 
from the kid. . . She kept talking about drugs and, you know, you 
need to get help, and just things like that." (MS 24). The subject 
matter of the argument did not provide the officers with further 
clues for their burglary investigation. 
The "kid" was apparently taken away from the parents. 
(MS 7). Understandably upset, the mother yelled at her husband for 
his role in the situation. While the father may have needed "to get 
help," his problem with drugs was fully consistent with the severity 
of the situation. Moreover, there was no indication whether the 
husband's problem with "drugs or narcotics" involved either illegal 
"street" drugs or prescription drugs. (MS 7, 15, 24). Nothing the 
Smiths said pertained to prescription drugs. 
Nevertheless, the officers simply concluded that the "drug" 
discussion was in some way related to the burglary. Such a 
conclusion was not supported by the content of the discussion. The 
Smiths were not discussing details of a burglary. They were not 
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discussing how "great" drugs were or the amount of drugs that were 
stolen. In short, they were not discussing anything related to the 
pharmacy burglary. Rather, the Smiths were attempting to resolve a 
serious family crisis. Their family crisis, like many other neglect 
cases, involved a problem with drugs. Cf. Annotation, Physical 
Abuse of Child by Parent as Ground for Termination of Parental Right 
to Child, 53 A.L.R.3d 605 §4(a) (mistreatment due to alcoholism). 
In addition, the officers could not have truly believed 
that the argument required prompt intervention. They would not have 
patiently stood outside the apartment door, listening to prolonged 
bouts of yelling which they could hear "down the hall" if the noise 
level had in fact constituted a "disturbance." (MS 15, 24). 
Officer Jensen admitted that they listened to the arguing for 
approximately ten minutes. (MS 15). Sergeant Jackson stated that 
they "probably listened a good five minutes, anyway" before they 
acted. (MS 24). None of the officers felt the immediate need to 
quell the argument prior to entering the apartment. Indeed, Officer 
Jensen conceded that the officers wanted to hear what the Smiths 
were arguing about, probably because they were in search of further 
clues: "We [the officers] listened outside the door. There was a 
lot of yelling, a lot of disturbance. We were curious as to why." 
(MS 6). The officers uncovered no further clues. 
After determining that the Smiths were upset about their 
child, the officers forced their way into the apartment. The police 
did not knock on the door, nor did they ask for permission to 
enter. (MS 33, 34, 38). The door "flew open" and the police 
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officers entered the apartment. (MS 33, 38). One officer claimed 
that he had a search warrant. (MS 33, 35, 39). The officers 
handcuffed Robert and Linda Smith on a love seat and a couch in the 
living room while they searched the home. (MS 35, 41). There was 
no justification for the arrest or the search. U.S. Const, 
amend IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980); Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968) (when 
an individual consents to a search only after the police have 
asserted that they have a search warrant, the consent cannot be 
considered to have been "freely given"). 
Prudent officers would not have had probable cause to 
believe that a man, heard arguing in his third floor apartment with 
his wife over their child and "drugs," was a suspect of a burglary 
when the only other facts known to the officers was that a 
"partially full container of Demerol," which may or may not have 
been stolen from the pharmacy, was found on the* second floor of the 
complex where the "suspect" and many other tenants lived, and that 
two quarters were found beside an apartment door. Cf. U.CA. 
§ 77-7-2 (1982). Accordingly, the evidence should have been 
suppressed. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) ("if 
evidence used against the defendant had been found to have been 
acquired in violation of constitutional guarantees, its exclusion 
would be inevitably required"). 
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B. IF PROBABLE CAUSE DID EXIST, THE POLICE 
OFFICERS STILL PERFORMED AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the information known to the 
officers did support a finding of probable cause, they still were 
not justified in entering the apartment or in arresting the Smiths. 
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy 
in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of 
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the 
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's 
home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and 
specific constitutional terms: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall 
not be violated." That language unequivocally 
establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core 
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion. In terms that 
apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures 
of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line 
at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be 
crossed without a warrant. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (citations omitted); 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("Even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person within, 
the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unannounced police intrusion 
into a private home, with or without an arrest warrant, except 
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers7 authority 
and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief 
that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or 
(3) where those within, made aware of the presence of someone 
outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), 
are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the 
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belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being 
attempted). 
The officers in the case at bar admitted that they neither 
possessed nor claimed to have a search warrant when they entered the 
Smiths' apartment. (MS 44). No exigent circumstances existed. The 
officers listened to the Smiths argue for five to ten minutes before 
deciding to act.5 (MS 15, 24). The Smiths were not aware of the 
officers7 presence outside the door. (MS 30-31). As explained by 
Judge Leventhal in an opinion given much consideration by the Pavton 
Court, "absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search 
for . . . contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been 
committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating 
evidence will be found within." Payton, 445 U.S at 587-88 
(construing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(en banc) (Leventhal, J.); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. , 109 
L.Ed.2d 85, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990) ("a suspect should not be arrested 
in his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is 
probable cause to arrest him"). Thus, even if probable cause did in 
5
 If the Smiths were arguing when Officers Jensen and 
Linton first discovered the two quarters, the officers had ample 
time to make a request for a warrant while they awaited the arrival 
of Sergeant Jackson. See U.C.A. § 77-23-4(2) (1982) (telephone 
authorization for a warrant); see supra note 1. If the Smiths began 
arguing just before the arrival of the three officers, nothing 
overheard in the conversation would have required immediate action 
by the police. Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (absent a 
demonstrable threat of imminent destruction of evidence, the 
authorities may not enter a residence in order to preserve that 
evidence without a warrant). 
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fact exist, the officers' warrantless and nonconsensual entry 
rendered the evidence inadmissible. 
POINT II 
EVEN THOUGH A WARRANT MAY NOT BE REQUIRED TO ENTER A 
HOUSE WHEN CONSENT HAS IN FACT BEEN PROPERLY GIVEN, 
THE OFFICERS DID NOT RECEIVE APPELLANT'S CONSENT TO 
ENTER THE HOUSE. 
In order to avoid the "reach" of Payton, the State must 
prove that the officers, acting without a warrant, received Robert 
Smith's consent to enter the apartment and also obtained Linda 
Smith's consent to search the premises. The State must then prove 
that the officers did not exceed the scope of consent, if any, given 
to them by the Smiths. See State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 
15 (Utah 1990). 
A. THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT THE SMITHS 
CONSENTED TO THE POLICE OFFICERS' ENTRY INTO 
THE APARTMENT. 
"The burden of establishing the existence of one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the prosecution. To 
establish the consent exception, the state must demonstrate that the 
consent was voluntary." Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15; see also 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) ("The exceptions are 
'jealously and carefully drawn,7 and there must be a Showing by 
those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation 
made [the search] imperative.7"). 
The State did not meet its burden. Robert and Linda Smith 
both testified that in the midst of their argument, the door "flew 
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open." (MS 33, 38). The officers did not knock on the door, nor 
did they receive permission to enter the apartment. (MS 34, 38). 
Rather, "they kicked the door in," causing damage to the door 
handle, the "upper left-hand side of the door," and the door frame. 
(MS 36). After the entry by the officers, the door would no longer 
lock from the inside or the outside. (MS 40). 
Though the police stated that they received permission to 
enter the apartment, (MS 44), they failed to produce corroborating 
evidence which would have unquestionably refuted the Smiths' 
testimony. "A finding [of fact, consent,] not supported by 
substantial, competent evidence must be rejected." Arroyo, 137 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 14 (citation omitted). Officer Jackson believed that 
they had taken photographs of the apartment, "the door or the area 
around the door," and the "hallway where the quarters were found." 
(MS 44). Curiously, the photographs were never presented to the 
court. Having missed its opportunity to "tip the scales" in its 
favor, the State did not carry its burden of proof. Moreover, as 
explained below, other circumstances existed which also evidenced a 
lack of voluntary consent. 
B. EVEN IF CONSENT WAS GIVEN FOR ENTRY INTO THE 
APARTMENT, IT WAS NOT GIVEN VOLUNTARILY. 
"The case law holds that a consent which is not voluntarily 
given is invalid." State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah 
1990). "Generally, whether the requisite voluntariness exists 
depends on 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both 
the characteristics of the accused and the details of police 
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conduct." Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. The totality of the 
surrounding circumstances include the pretextual approach used by 
the officers to gain entry into the apartment and the lack of 
specific consent given freely and intelligently by Robert Smith. 
1. The pretextual approach used by the police 
invalidated the consent given to enter the 
apartment. 
lf[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement officers to use 
a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more 
serious crime." State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 
1988) . As noted by the Sierra Court: 
The violation of a constitutional right by a 
subterfuge cannot be justified. . . Were the use of 
misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for searching 
people suspected of felonies to be permitted, a 
mockery could be made of the Fourth Amendment and its 
guarantees. The courts must be vigilant to detect and 
prevent such a misuse of legal processes. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977 (citing Taalavore v. United States. 291 F.2d 
262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961); Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740 (1984); 
cf. State v. Lorenzo. 743 S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Mo. App. 1987) 
("Consent to search cannot be considered freely and intelligently 
given when a police officer misleads the person from whom consent is 
sought as to his intentions"). 
When Officers Jensen and Linton summoned Sergeant Jackson 
to the apartment complex, Jackson was not informed about the 
"disturbance," a possible misdemeanor offense. (MS 27); U.C.A. 
§ 76-9-102 (1982) . Instead, the officers first became aware of the 
"disturbance" after looking "up and down the hallway [for 
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approximately fifteen minutes] to see if [they] could find any more 
items that may have [been] related to the burglary." (MS 5, 14). 
The officers did not receive a complaint about the "yelling" from 
the neighbors above, below, or beside the Smiths. Indeed, if the 
noise had been as loud as the officers contended, a reasonable 
officer would have acted immediately. Cf. U.C.A. 
§ 76-9-102(1) (b) (iii) (1982) (a person is guilty of "'Disorderly 
Conduct" if he makes unreasonable noises in a p>rivate place which 
can be heard in a public place); see also U.C.A. § 10-8-50 (1986) 
("Disturbing the peace"). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the noise did rise to the 
level of "disorderly conduct," the officers only used the argument 
as a pretext to search for evidence of the burglary. Officer Jensen 
did not mention the burglary. Rather, he asked Robert Smith only, 
"what the noise was about [and] informed him they were creating a 
disturbance." (MS 8). However, the officers had already discovered 
"what the noise was about," having just overheard the argument. 
(MS 7, 15, 24) . 
The officers had similarly accomplished another purposes 
to eliminate the disturbance. The Smiths stopped arguing after the 
officers knocked on the door. The officers should have warned the 
Smiths about the noise and departed immediately or, at most, issued 
a citation for disorderly conduct. See U.C.A. § 76-9-102 (1982) 
(Disorderly conduct "is a class C misdemeanor if the offense 
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise, it is 
an infraction"). The officers did not have to enter the apartment. 
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No exigencies or signs of domestic violence existed. If "it is 
impermissible for . . . officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a 
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime," Sierra, 
754 P.2d at 977, it should be even more egregious for officers to 
use a misdemeanor inquiry as a pretext to search for evidence of a 
more serious crime. 
Because the true purpose of the officers7 questioning was 
based on a hunch, they chose not to inform Robert Smith about their 
desire to discuss the burglary. If the officers had been more 
forthright, Robert Smith may not have been so accommodating, as 
alleged by the State, to allow the police into his home. 
Consequently, Robert Smith did not "freely and intelligently" give 
his consent to the officers. As alluded to previously: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely 
and intelligently given"; (2) the government must 
prove consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977) 
reprinted in State v. Marshall. 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 49 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Even according to the officers' own testimony, Robert Smith 
was never told that they wanted to talk about the burglary (MS 16, 
28). Smith could thus not have specifically consented to the 
officers' entry for anything other than the "disturbance." While 
the officers may have subjectively intended to discuss the burglary, 
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(MS 8), they did not convey their intentions to the Smiths. Consent 
was not "freely and intelligently given." 
2. Appellant involuntarily responded to the 
officers' command. 
An individual's acquiescence to the "color" of police 
authority cannot be considered to have been given voluntarily. See 
State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1990) ; Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Johnson, officers 
"experienced in narcotic work . . . recognized [the] strong odor of 
burning opium" coming from a hotel room. 333 U.S. at 12. Not 
knowing who occupied the room, the officers knocked on the door and 
identified themselves. After a slight delay and "some 'shuffling or 
noise'" in the room, the defendant opened the door. 
The officer said, "I want to talk to you a little 
bit." She [the defendant] then, as he describes it, 
"stepped back acquiescently and admitted us." He 
said, "I want to talk to you about this opium smell 
in the room here." She denied that there was such a 
smell. Then he said, "I want you to consider 
yourself under arrest because we are going to search 
the room." The search turned up incriminating opium 
and smoking apparatus, the latter being warm, 
apparently from recent use. This evidence the 
District Court refused to suppress before trial and 
submitted over defendant's objection at the trial. 
Conviction resulted and the Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added). 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 
"Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of 
the search, was demanded under color of office. It was granted in 
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submission to authority rather than as an understanding and 
intentional waiver of a constitutional right." 333 U.S. at 13. 
Through a comparison of the two cases, Robert Smith's 
"consent" was equally submissive. The officers in Johnson smelled 
opium emanating from the defendant's hotel room. The officers here 
heard an argument coming from Robert Smith's apartment. Neither set 
of officers obtained a warrant though the officers in Johnson, 
unlike the officers here, at least possessed facts supportive of 
probable cause. Cf. Llaauno v. Minaey. 739 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th 
Cir. 1984) ("[I]n assessing the officers criteria for probable cause 
to effect a warrantless arrest, it is appropriate to consider 
whether there was sufficient information to obtain an arrest 
warrant"); Henry v. United States. 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (Common rumor, 
suspicion, or even a "strong reason to suspect," is not adequate to 
support a warrant for arrest). Acting prematurely, the officers in 
each case bypassed a judicial determination and acted on their own. 
The Johnson officers knocked on the door and said, "I want 
to talk to you a little bit." 333 U.S. at 12. The "Smith" officers 
knocked on the door and, after using a misleading purpose to justify 
their intrusion, said, "We'd like to talk to you. Could we come 
in?" (MS 43). Defendant Johnson and Robert Smith both acquiesced. 
The search of Johnson's room turned up illegal drugs and 
paraphernalia. The search of Smith's apartment uncovered "Demerol," 
a lawful prescription drug; a syringe; and some quarters. Both 
district courts refused to suppress the evidence. The decision of 
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the district court in Johnson was reversed. The decision of the 
district court, here, should similarly be reversed. 
Robert Smith was not approached in the context of a 
permissible casual "police/citizen encounter"; rather, Smith was 
approached in his home and placed on the defensive. He was not 
greeted with cursory salutations. He was confronted by three 
identifiable6 officers. The officers would not have permitted Smith 
to say "no" to their "request" and to then close the door. Cf. 
United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988) (police 
conducted an unjustified "search" of a hotel room when they gained 
visual entry into the room through a door which was opened at their 
command while they stood in the hotel corridor). 
POINT III 
IF PROPER CONSENT HAD BEEN GIVEN, THE OFFICERS 
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT SINCE THE OFFICERS 
HELD NO REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE SMITHS WERE ARMED 
AND DANGEROUS. 
"Even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an 
initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." 
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (construing 
6
 At the very least, Officer Jensen was identifiable as a 
police officer. Mr. Cook would not have approached Jensen and told 
him about the pill container if Jensen was not an officer, nor would 
the owner of the pharmacy have assisted Jensen in the burglary 
investigation. (MS 3, 4). Officer Linton, having accompanied 
Officer Jensen and Mr. Cook to the apartment, was probably Jensens 
partner or an officer arriving at the scene. (MS 4,, 12). Sergeant 
Jackson received Officer Jensen's call for assistance through 
"dispatch," the police radio. 
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Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)); State v. Arroyo, 137 
Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah 1990) (if consent was obtained through 
the police exploitation of a prior illegality, the consent is not 
valid). 
In Schlosser, the Court considered whether a police officer 
exceeded the scope of a lawful traffic stop when he opened the 
vehicle's door for investigatory purposes. Finding the officer's 
actions unwarranted, the Court deemed the evidence seized in the 
search to be inadmissible. The established exceptions did not apply: 
If no arrest is made, an officer may make a 
warrantless search of the automobile only if there 
is probable cause for the search, or if the officer 
has a reasonable and "articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is potentially dangerous." 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135. 
Like the officer in Schlosser who made an initial lawful 
traffic stop, the officer here may have also made an initial lawful 
inquiry about the "disturbance." The subsequent actions of both 
officers, however, exceeded the scope of their authority. If an 
officer makes a traffic stop, he or she may not open the passenger 
door for investigatory purposes. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132. 
Similarly, if Robert Smith permitted the officers to enter his 
apartment to discuss a disturbance, the officers could not then 
subject Linda Smith to an unnecessary search. Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321 (1987) (an officer conducted an invalid search when he 
moved stereo equipment for reasons unrelated to his justified entry 
into an apartment, and because he had less than probable cause to 
believe the equipment was stolen). 
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"Any police activity that transcends the actual scope of 
the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
suspect." State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citation omitted). Robert Smith authorized the officers' entry 
into his apartment to talk only about the "disturbance." (MS 16). 
When the officers entered, however, nothing in the record reflects 
any questions by the officers which would have helped them find out 
"what the noise was about . . . ." (MS 8). The officers, instead, 
converged immediately on Robert and Linda Smith. 
An officer may forego the warrant requirement for a search 
if he or she "has a reasonable belief, based on 'specific and 
articulable facts,' that the person may be armed and dangerous." 
State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted); 
State v. Schlosserf 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1988) (a search must 
be justified by probable cause). While the officers, here, may have 
been concerned about their own safety, there was no indication that 
the Smiths did, or could have done, anything that would have 
endangered the officers. The Smiths were arguing when the officers 
knocked on the door. The officers did not state thcit the Smiths 
delayed answering the door or made suspicious noises which would 
have forewarned the officers of possible danger. 
Linda Smith was "just inside the doorway to the kitchen, 
probably ten feet away" from her husband. (MS 9). When Officer 
Jensen confronted Robert Smith, Sergeant Jackson confronted Linda 
Smith. (MS 9, 24). Jackson observed Linda "holding a box in one 
hand and walking towards the garbage can with it. . . ." (MS 25). 
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She had her other "hand clenched." Jackson saw her put the box in 
the garbage and noticed that her other hand was still closed. "So 
[he] asked her, 'What do you have in there? What's in there?' And 
she reached over and put her hand over on the counter. So [he] just 
grabbed her [by the wrist] and she opened [her hand] up and there 
were two glass ampules in her hand." (MS 25). 
Sergeant Jackson could not have reasonably believed that 
Linda Smith was armed and dangerous. Linda Smith did not reach for 
a weapon nor did she appear to possess one. Not only was her hand 
closed, it was "clenched." A gun, a knife, or a weapon could not 
have been hidden in her hand. Linda Smith communicated this fact to 
Jackson when she put her hand on the counter for his viewing. 
Sergeant Jackson's testimony did not reveal any fear of Mrs. Smith's 
movements or of the possibility of her being armed and dangerous. 
Nothing stated in the record justified the search of Linda Smith's 
hand. Cf. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1988) (a 
search must be justified by probable cause). Like the officer in 
Schlosser, Sergeant Jackson: 
had no warrant, no probable cause, and no 
articulable suspicion either that his safety was in 
danger or that the occupants were engaged in 
criminal activity. He cited no safety concerns as 
the basis for his actions; he sought only to 
investigate the possibility that defendants were 
engaged in illegal activity . . . . 
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989). If the Smiths 
did permit the officers to enter their apartment, the officers 
exceeded the consent by searching Linda Smith's hand. The search of 
her hand was unlawful. 
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POINT IV 
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT LINDA SMITH CONSENTED 
TO THE OFFICERS' SEARCH OF THEIR APARTMENT. 
As explained above, consent must be "freely and 
intelligently given . . . without duress or coercion,,11 State v. 
Marshall. 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 49 (Utah App. 1990) (citing United 
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977). According to 
Sergeant Jackson, when he entered the apartment he did not ask Linda 
Smith about the argument. (MS 26). Rather, he wanted to see what 
she was putting in the garbage. Because Linda Smith did not 
"freely" disclose what was in her hand, Jackson asked her, "What do 
you have in there?" (MS 25). Linda Smith did not respond. 
(MS 29). Then Jackson "reached over and just grabbed it." 
(MS 29). Only after Jackson grabbed her, did Linda Smith open up 
her hand and consent to the search of the apartment. (MS 25, 29). 
Hence, Sergeant Jackson's coercive acts precipitated and nullified 
Linda Smith's consent. Her consent was not given voluntarily. 
Moreover, even if Linda Smith's consent was voluntary, "the 
mere fact a consent to a search or a seizure is voluntary does not 
necessarily remove the taint [of a prior illegality]." Arroyo, 137 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 17 (construing State v. Gates, 202 Conn. 615, 621, 
522 A.2d 788, 791 (1987)). The consent to search the apartment would 
not have been "purged of the taint" of the prior consent 
involuntarily given to enter the apartment. 
Valid consent did not exist for either the entry into the 
apartment or for the search of the apartment. According to the 
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police, the Smiths did not physically oppose the officers or 
verbally object to the 4:00 a.m. intrusion. They acquiesced fully 
and voluntarily to each and every "request" made by the officers. 
Consequently, the officers should not have found it necessary to 
handcuff the Smiths, (MS 18); nor should Sergeant Jackson have 
"called another officer to stand by Mr. Smith, [who was already 
handcuffed,] just to watch him," (MS 31), for a search that lasted 
only ten minutes (MS 35), when there were already three officers on 
the scene. The actions alleged by the officers do not appear 
consistent with the consent allegedly given by the Smiths. The 
officers' actions were consistent, however, with officers who had 
just forced their way into an apartment and were uncertain about how 
submissive and cooperative the occupants would be. The officers did 
not receive valid consent. 
POINT V 
THE OFFICERS' CONDUCT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN 
HINDSIGHT. 
The evidence found in the apartment, though it mysteriously 
lacked other drugs which would have been present from the "large 
amounts" of drugs stolen from the pharmacy, (MS 20), should not be 
considered a justification for the police misconduct. "That 
reasoning, however, 'justify[ing] the arrest by the search and at 
the same time . . . the search by the arrest,' just 'will not do.,H 
Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. , 108 L.Ed.2d 464, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1289 
(1990). In a per curiam opinion, the Smith Court ruled that a 
search is not justified when its legality is based solely upon the 
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evidence seized during the search. Id. Police cannot maintain the 
circular argument, the Court held, that the search was properly 
incident to an arrest that could be justified only by the fruits of 
the search. Id. The Smith reasoning should also apply to the case 
at bar. The evidence seized should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ^ 7 day of September, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
TEXT OF gTATUTgg fKD CONSTXTPTXPNAfr PRQVTSTOK8 
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papersf and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in thexr 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon, 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
10-8-50. Disturbing the peace — Public intoxication — 
Fighting — Obscene langaage — Disorderly con-
duct — Lewd behavior — Interference with offi-
cers — Trespass-
They may provide for the punishment of any person or persons for: (1) 
disturbing the peace or good order of the city, (2) disturbing the peace of any 
person or persons, (3) disturbing any lawful assembly, (4) public intoxication, 
(5) challenging, encouraging or engaging in fighting, (6) using obscene or 
profane language in a place or under circumstances which could cause a 
breach of the peace or good order of the city, (7) engaging in indecent or 
disorderly conduct, (8) engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior or conduct in 
the city, and (9) interfering with any city officer in the discharge of his duty. 
They may provide for the punishment of trespass and such other petty of-
fenses as the board of commissioners or city council may deem proper. 
History: R A 1898 & C A. 1907, § 206, refers to boards of commissioners and city 
subd. 53; L» 1911, en. 120, § 1; 1915, ch. 100, councils of cities. See i 10-8-L 
§ 1; CX. 1917, § 570x52; TLS. 1933 & C. 1943, Cross-References, — Lewdness, § 76-9-
15*50; L. 1973, ch. 11, § 1. 702. 
76-9-102. Disorderly conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move 
from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offen-
sive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate puipose; or 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening 
behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be 
heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or, obscene language or makes obscene 
gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which 
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is 
not limited to streets, highways, and the common area*; of schools, hospitals, 
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offeose continues 
after a request by a person to desist Otherwise it is an infraction. 
77-7-2.. By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony lias been commit-
ted and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
o i8)kr h 6 ^ h e hBS r ? a ! o n a b l e « " " to ^lieve the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense: or (c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person* 
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and witnesses — 
Witness not in physical presence of magistrate — 
Duplicate original warrants — Return. 
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the issuance of a search 
warrant shall be given on oath and either reduced to writing or recorded 
verbatim. Transcription of the recorded testimony need not precede the issu-
ance of the warrant. Any person having standing to contest the search may 
request and shall be provided with a transcription of the recorded testimony 
in support of the application for the warrant 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence of an 
affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a^  
person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate provided the 
magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the war-
rant. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by 
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and transcribed 
After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the magistrate and 
filed with the court This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for 
purposes of this section. 
